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Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and
Taxpayers? Comment
Introduction
Economically-minded observers have long argued that market discipline would create incentives for more efficient educational production (e.g. Friedman 1962; Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Chubb and Moe 1990) . Although this argument is theoretically compelling, it is difficult to support empirically. One important difficulty is that the claim is about general equilibrium dynamics of competition among providers, and cannot be tested with small-scale interventions like the school voucher programs studied by Rouse (1998) , Krueger and Zhu (2003) , and many others. Although
Chile and New Zealand have each adopted large-scale choice policies (Hsieh and Urquiola 2003;
Fiske and Ladd 2000), there is as yet no large-scale, long-run choice implementation in the United
States with which to study the effects of competition among schools.
The most compelling domestic evidence on productivity effects comes from studies of "Tiebout choice," the use of the residential location decision to choose among neighboring local monopoly providers. In an influential paper in this Review, Hoxby (2000) argues that metropolitan housing markets with more fragmented school governance offer more choice to consumers, which produces greater competitive pressures on providers. Measures of fragmentation, however, are potentially endogenous to school productivity. There has been a great deal of consolidation of school districts in the United States since World War II, and the extent of consolidation in any particular area may have depended on the productivity of local schools. Additionally, families with children may concentrate in desirable districts, implying that district enrollments themselves are endogenous. Hoxby proposes variation in topography-which may have influenced optimal jurisdictional size before modern transportation technologies-as a source of exogenous variation.
Instrumenting a measure of Tiebout choice in a metropolitan area with the number of streams flowing through that area, she finds substantial positive effects of choice on student test scores and other academic outcomes.
1 This paper presents a re-analysis of this result, using to the extent possible the same data and specifications used by Hoxby. The decision to revisit Hoxby's analysis is motivated by two considerations. First, it has been proposed that estimates of choice's productivity effects are biased-most likely upward-by the use, as in Hoxby's study, of a sample of students enrolled in public schools (Hsieh and Urquiola 2003) . Second, recent estimates of specifications similar to
Hoxby's on alternative data sets have come to substantively different conclusions (Rothstein 2003) .
It is thus important to understand whether Hoxby's results are sensitive to the exact sample and specification used.
With the restricted-access National Educational Longitudinal Survey (NELS) data that
Hoxby uses in her preferred specifications, and following her description of her data construction, I
am unable to precisely replicate Hoxby's sample. When I estimate a specification similar to hers-I have access to only one of her two "streams" instruments, though it is by far the strongest in her first stage-on my replication sample, I obtain quite different results. My point estimates indicate a smaller, insignificant effect of choice on students' test scores. Moreover, when I use techniques that are robust to the data's likely clustered error structure, I estimate standard errors that are substantially larger than are Hoxby's, enough so that even her point estimates are indistinguishable from zero.
After presenting the replication estimates, I consider the impact on the estimated choice effect of small alterations to the sample and specification. I propose a new and substantially more powerful instrument-capturing the same initial conditions proxied by the streams variables-for the Tiebout choice measure; I explore two techniques for ridding estimates of potential bias from selection into the private sector; I present several estimates of the sampling variance of the choice coefficient; and I extend the analysis to a new data set with observations on over 300,000 SATtakers, drawn from nearly every high school in each sample metropolitan area, from the same cohort surveyed in the NELS.
Estimates of models similar to Hoxby's appear to be sensitive to the choice of instruments
and to the exact sample definition. Although standard errors are quite large, I find some (statistically insignificant) evidence supporting the contention that estimates from public school samples are biased upward by endogenous selection into private schools. This suggests that analyses similar to
Hoxby's, even if robust and precise, are limited in their ability to estimate the effects of competition on school productivity.
I conclude that Hoxby's positive estimated effect of interdistrict competition on school output is not robust, and that a fair read of the NELS evidence does not support claims of a large or significant effect. I do not find compelling evidence of endogeneity of the choice index to school quality, suggesting that the more precise negative (but insignificant) OLS estimate of choice's effect on student outcomes should be preferred to less precise IV estimates. An implementation of a specification similar to Hoxby's in the SAT-taker data supports my conclusions from the NELS.
Hoxby's empirical specification, the data, and the sample construction are described in the next two sections. Section 4 presents the first stage analysis, using as instruments for choice both a version of Hoxby's "smaller streams" variable and an alternative variable characterizing available choice in the metropolitan area in 1942. Basic replication estimates for the NELS test score models are in Section 5, as are estimates using the new instrument. Section 6 explores the robustness of these estimates to slight modifications in the sample. Section 7 presents two attempts to account for 4 the selection bias introduced by the use of a sample of public school students. Section 8 considers the sampling variability of the OLS and IV coefficients, comparing Hoxby's "random effects" standard error estimator (Moulton 1986) with less parametric estimators. Section 9 describes the SAT data and presents estimates derived from them.
Empirical specification
Hoxby estimates models of the form
where t isdm is the test score of student i at school s in district d in metropolitan area m. c m is the choice index, a size-adjusted count of the number of districts serving MA m. X m , X dm , X sdm , and X isdm are control variables measured at the MA, district, school, and individual level, respectively. (To the extent that the same measures appear at several levels, X sdm is the average of X isdm among all students at school s, and so on, although in practice this may not hold in the data because we observe only a sample of students at school s, and because data at different levels derive from different sources.)
The error term in (1), ε isdm , is not, in general, independent across observations in the same school, and we might write , thus loading any across-market variation in average public school quality onto e m . 3 The discussion assumes that (1) is correctly specified to absorb all peer effects in educational production in the coefficient vector γ sdm , and that there are no interactions between, for example, individual-and school-level characteristics. If (1) is not correctly specified, the biases in estimates of β are difficult to sign; these biases are exacerbated by the likely effects of choice on the stratification of students across schools (see, e.g., Rothstein 2003). 4 From an earlier version of Hoxby's paper: "Since concentration appears to affect the sorting of students into private schools, potential for sample selection bias exists when we look only at the students who remain in public schools. If, for instance, one of the effects of greater public school enrollment concentration is making abler students more likely to 6 importance of this form of bias, first by adding private school students to the sample and second by including an inverse Mills ratio derived from the metropolitan private enrollment rate as a control variable in (1).
Sampling variance
Because the error structure (2) is non-classical, traditional standard errors overstate the precision of estimates. Under common assumptions, the true variance of the OLS estimator is 
[ ]
Hoxby reports (p. 1219) using Moulton's formula with metropolitan-and district-level error components, thus implicitly imposing
For most of the current analysis, I report both classical standard errors, which ignore the clustered structure of the data, and "clustered" standard errors, which are consistent in the presence of arbitrary within-MSA error covariances. The attend private schools, then public school students' performance will be worse in concentrated SMSAs simply because selection into the public school student sample is negatively correlated with ability," (Hoxby 1994b, p. 24 There are several available estimators of these variance components, and neither Moulton nor Hoxby specifies which is to be used. My implementation estimates them from the contrast between individual and group-mean residual variances, extending Greene's (2000, pp. 570-2) discussion of random effects in unbalanced panels to the multi-level hierarchy considered here. Other consistent estimators might use the residual variance of within-and between-group versions of (1); the within-group empirical covariances; or an optimal minimum distance estimator using the entire empirical covariance matrix ε ε ′ . Census STF-3B tabulation, and matching to these data assigns nearly every NELS school to a unique zip code. Most zip codes lie either entirely within a single MSA or entirely outside any MSA, so the zip code uniquely assigns the vast majority of schools in the NELS sample. This leads to changes in 3 public schools' MSA codes, and provides MSA assignments for 174 private schools. Table 2 ) and analogous models derived from the replication sample. 11 Hoxby uses two instruments for the educational market structure, counts of "larger" and "smaller" streams flowing through each MA. Only the latter, derived from the public-use Geographic Names Information System (GNIS), is available for the current analysis. 12 In Hoxby's model, reproduced in Column 1 of Table 1 , the "smaller streams" instrument accounts for a much larger share of the variance of the choice index than does the "larger streams" instrument. Moreover, Hoxby writes that "one has more a priori confidence in the exogeneity of the smaller streams variable because smaller streams are too small to affect modern life" (p. 1230). Thus, estimates that rely solely on the smaller streams instrument should be consistent and nearly as efficient as those from Hoxby's two-instrument specification. In any case, the replication estimate of the smaller streams coefficient in Column 2 is quite similar to the corresponding coefficient in Hoxby's model.
First Stage
13
Columns 3 and 4 report estimates using a new instrument. To the extent that the initial conditions influencing current market structure are exogenous to current school quality, as must be assumed for validity of the streams instruments, historical measures of market structure at a far enough remove also provide exogenous variation in current choice. I construct an estimate of the choice index in 1942, using counts of the independent school districts serving each county in the United States at that time (Gray 1944) and assuming that all districts were equally sized. 14 This measure is a substantially more powerful predictor of 1990 choice than are the streams variables. Table 2 reports basic replication estimates of OLS and IV models for the NELS 12 th grade reading scores. Columns A and B report Hoxby's reported coefficient and standard error on the district choice index, estimated by OLS and IV respectively. The latter is the only model for which destination to assign them to metropolitan areas; I use instead a GNIS variable that codes each county through which each stream flows. 13 One major point of divergence is the population coefficient. Hoxby reports that her population measure is scaled in thousands, so I multiply her coefficient by 10,000 to obtain the effect-per-ten million reported in I have also estimated models similar to those shown here for the remainder of the NELS' fifteen test scores (reading, mathematics, history/geography, science, and a composite score in each of three grades). Classical test statistics reject zero for only four of the 60 estimated coefficients, all from models for the history/geography score and half with negative point estimates.
Replication estimates
Sensitivity to sample specification
The estimates presented thus far have used the CCD MSA codes as the sole source of information about NELS schools' locations. The sample changes slightly when erroneous MSA codes are repaired, by hand for obvious errors or by recourse to the other sources of geocoding information in the CCD and NELS. 
Private enrollment and selection bias
As discussed earlier, estimates from samples of public school students can be biased relative to choice's effect on public school productivity if choice has an effect on the selection of students into private schools. Let In her Tables 5 and 6 (Heckman 1979; Garen 1984; Card and Payne 2002) , which attempts to absorb selection bias by controlling directly for the selection process as summarized by the MSA private enrollment rate. If the selection bias is in the hypothesized direction, either strategy should produce a smaller (more negative) estimate of the choice effect. Table 5 explores the first strategy. Including private schools in the sample requires modifying Hoxby's specification somewhat, as district-level (SDDB) covariates are not available for these schools and they may only be matched to MSAs using the NELS zip code variables. The first six rows of the table explore the impact of excluding the SDDB covariates, which are not needed for consistent estimation of β as long as the MSA-level aggregates of these variables are included in X m .
Rows 1 and 3 report estimates of the base specification from the base replication sample and from 17 Hoxby (1994a) adopts this strategy to study the effect of private school competition on public school performance.
15 the zip-code matched sample of public schools, respectively. Rows 2 and 5 repeat these estimates without district-level covariates, while rows 3 and 6 add back to the samples 6 public schools previously excluded for lack of SDDB data. Excluding the SDDB covariates produces slightly more negative choice effects in each IV specification, while adding the 6 schools missing SDDB data has essentially no effect. Finally, row 7 adds 174 private schools in the NELS sample. This produces a slightly more negative effect in the "streams" specification, but the other three estimates are less negative with private schools included.
One explanation for these uneven results might be that there is substantial sampling variability in the MSA private enrollment rate in the NELS sample, which includes less than one private school per MSA. For this reason, I turn to the control-function approach in Table 6 . First on the basic replication sample (in Panel A) and then on the zip-code-matched public school sample (Panel B), I modify Hoxby's basic specification by including a control for an inverse Mills ratio derived from the MSA-level private enrollment rate, measured from Census data. 18 The Mills ratio coefficients are uniformly negative: Higher private enrollment rates seem to reduce public school average scores, as would be expected if private school students are positively selected, though only three of the eight estimates are significant. The inclusion of the private enrollment control lowers the choice effect slightly in all eight specifications. These effects, though again far from significant, are again consistent with the hypothesized selection bias in Hoxby's specification, and suggest that estimates of her specification may be upward-biased estimates of the effect of interdistrict choice on public school productivity. 18 The inverse Mills ratio is ( )
, where j is the MSA private enrollment rate (Card and Payne 2002) . Specifications that instead include a polynomial in the private enrollment rate do not fit the data better than does the Mills ratio specification, and have similar consequences for the choice coefficient.
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8. The clustered error structure and standard error estimates I consider in this section several estimators of the sampling variance of the OLS and IV coefficients that are robust to the NELS data's clustered error structure. I am unable to reproduce Hoxby's standard errors. When I use her district and metropolitan area random effects specification, my estimated standard errors are 15-30% larger than hers; more robust error estimates range from 20-70% larger than those that she reports.
The NELS used a stratified sampling scheme, in which just over 1,000 schools were selected and 25 students were surveyed from each selected school. Table 7 ) in IV models. Standard errors in Column B range from one-third to two-thirds larger than in Column A.
Column C loosens the error specification, allowing both metropolitan and district error components. This is the model that Column D reports an even less restrictive specification that allows for a school component to the error term. In both panels, the school component is quite large, and in its presence there are no estimated district or metropolitan area components. 20 Standard errors are slightly larger than in Column C.
Finally, Columns E and F explore less parametric variance estimators that are robust to heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary correlations among the residuals of students in the same metropolitan area. Column E reports the "clustered" standard errors that were also reported in Tables 2 and 3 . These derive from a procedure that is consistent under arbitrary within-MSA covariance matrices, and therefore nests the error components model. Taken together, the estimates in Table 7 indicate that classical estimators substantially understate the sampling variability of the coefficient of interest in models like Hoxby's. All of the more robust estimators produce substantially larger standard errors than are estimated under the classical assumption of zero autocorrelation. This can have important implications for inference.
Compare the standard errors in Table 8 
Evidence from SAT Scores
Although the NELS provides a random sample of students and schools, it is somewhat thin:
There are fewer than 3 NELS public schools in the average MSA observed in the data, and over 100
MSAs contain no sample schools. The asymptotic distribution of the instrumental variables estimator may thus be a poor guide to its performance in the NELS sample. Table 8 Although the SAT sample is thick, it is not random: Students choose whether to take the SAT, and the average SAT-taking rate in the sample MSAs is about 45%. In an effort to avoid sample selection bias coming from this decision, I also control for a quadratic in the MSA public school SAT-taking rate. For comparability to earlier results, SAT scores are standardized to the same mean (50) and standard deviation (10) as the NELS scores.
None of the four models in Table 8 indicates a statistically significant effect of choice on student SAT scores. Moreover, three of the four point estimates are negative. Exogeneity tests fail to reject the negative OLS coefficient in any of the IV specifications. Finally, the point estimates are quite small: Where Hoxby's 8 th grade model indicates that a one unit increase in competition raises scores by 0.38 standard deviations, the effects in Table 9 range from -0.03 to +0.12, with an upper bound to the OLS confidence interval of +0.06.
Conclusion
The current analysis has not considered Hoxby's results from the NLSY, and cannot speak to the validity of her conclusions from those data, which echo her NELS results in indicating a salutary effect of interdistrict competition on school output. Hoxby seems to find her NELS estimates the most compelling, however, and focuses her discussion on these. The estimates from my reanalysis of the NELS data, along with the SAT score results, do not support Hoxby's conclusions that "naïve estimates (like OLS) that do not account for the endogeneity of school districts are biased toward finding no effects" (p. 1236). I find little evidence, in either data set, of bias in OLS estimates. OLS estimates are consistently more negative than are those from IV, but the difference is always well within the margin of sampling error.
There is similarly little evidence in the results presented here to support Hoxby's claim that "Tiebout choice raises productivity by simultaneously raising achievement and lowering spending" (p. 1236-7). I have not revisited Hoxby's results on the relationship between choice and school spending, but I am unable to find any discernable effect of choice on student achievement. A more conservative conclusion would be that the relatively few United States metropolitan areas, variation among which identifies the choice effects in the models considered here, are insufficient to precisely estimate any weak relationship that may exist between jurisdictional fragmentation and student performance. There is no basis here to reject a hypothesis of no effect, but neither is there much power against alternative claims of small effects, either positive or negative. Notes: Dependent variable is the NELS 12th grade reading score. Regressions use NELS weights, adjusted to weight each MSA equally. Following Hoxby, all columns include controls for MA-level population, land area, and 9 census division fixed effects, as well as for both district-and MA-level mean log household income and Gini coefficient; population fraction Asian, Hispanic, and Black; fraction of adults with some college and with BAs; and indices of racial, ethnic, and educational homogeneity. "nr"=Not reported in Hoxby (2000) . Replication columns C-F report classical standard errors in parentheses, not the errorcomponents estimates reported by Hoxby. Square brackets report "clustered" (on the MSA) standard errors for the choice coefficient. Using either errors, none of the unreported coefficients (except division effects) are significant in any of the replication specifications. Reported p -values for exogeneity tests are based on the classical standard errors. Notes : Each row explores a different method of assigning NELS schools to metropolitan areas. 115 schools are assigned differently in row 2 than in row 1; 3 in 3 than in 2; 19 in 4 than in 3; and 3 in 5 than in 4. Specifications are those in 2.
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4. Notes : Rows 1 and 3 report estimates of choice effect in Hoxby's specification from Table 4 , rows 1 and 5, respectively. Rows 2 and 3 add a control for an inverse Mills ratio derived from the MSA-level private enrollment rate to the Hoxby specification, using the same samples as in the preceeding rows. Classical standard errors in parentheses; clustered standard errors in square brackets.
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OLS IV Inverse Mills ratio coefficient
Hoxby specification
Hoxby specification
With control for private enrollment Notes: Columns A-E report alternative estimates of the standard error of the choice coefficient from the replication estimates in Table 3 , deriving from different assumptions about the correlation between the residual test scores of students in the same school, district, and MA. Column A assumes that all observations are independent, and reports classical standard errors. Columns B-D allow for components of the error at the MA; MA and district; and MA, district, and school levels, and estimate standard errors using Moulton's (1986) formula for random-effects-style models. Column E reports standard error estimates from STATA's "cluster" command, which is robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and within-MA serial correlation. Column F re-estimates the Hoxby model on MSA-level means, implicitly permitting arbitrary within-MA serial correlation, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Column G reports Hoxby's estimates, which she reports allow for district and MA error components as in Column C. Table 2 , as well as an inverse Mills ratio derived from the MSA-level private enrollment rate and a quadratic in the MSA public school SAT-taking rate. None of the suppressed control variable coefficients is significant in any specification, except land area in Column B and several division effects. 
Estimated choice effect IV
MA
